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The Fiduciary Duty of Former
Government Employees
A former White House adviser becomes a consultant to foreign busi-
nesses, using information gained from official involvement in secret
international trade negotiations.' A military officer from the Pentagon
resigns and goes to work for a munitions manufacturer for whom he
then renegotiates a government contract on the basis of confidential
government information. 2 An accountant, formerly with the Treasury
Department, advises an investing institution to buy government se-
curities because he knows that the terms of future government offer-
ings, as yet unreleased, will drive up the market price of outstanding
government securities.3
In each of these cases, confidential federal government information
is the basis for personal profit by former government employees. 4
This exploitation of unequal access to government information frus-
trates important public concerns: the efficient operation of govern-
ment programs, the absence of special advantages for certain private
1. Cf. Kwitny, Richard V. Allen Used White House Prestige Freely in Nixon Years,
Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1980, at 1, col. I (White House official allegedly leaked secret in-
formation about U.S. export-import policies to Japanese business associate close to Japa-
nese government leaders; after leaving office, same official and associate received con-
sulting contracts from Japanese).
2. Cf. Burnham, Ex-U.S. Aide, Now on Other Side, Stirs Conflicts Issue, N.Y. Times,
May 10, 1976, at 55, col. 1 (former HUD official obtained modifications for client in con-
tract official had worked on while at HUD).
3. See In re Blyth & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1037, 1038-39 (1969) (broker-dealer traded in gov-
ernment securities on basis of nonpublic information obtained from Federal Reserve Bank
employee).
4. Abuses by former government lawyers are also possible. See, e.g., Allied Realty of
St. Paul, Inc. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 283 F. Supp. 464 (D. Minn. 1968), aff'd, 408 F.2d
1099 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 823 (1969) (former Assistant United States Attorney
disqualified from taking position in civil litigation because of official involvement in
related criminal matter); Hilo Metals Co. v. Learner Co., 258 F. Supp. 23 (D. Hawaii 1966)
(plaintiff's counsel in antitrust case disqualified for having worked on substance of same
case while in Department of Justice Antitrust Division); Empire Linotype School, Inc. v.
United States, 143 F. Supp. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (attorney who had passed on contracts
while with Veterans' Administration barred from representing those contractors against
United States). This Note will focus on public servants other than lawyers because law-
yers are already subject to an ethical canon, which covers part of the scope of the rules
for government employees that this Note will propose. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
REsPO.SIBILITY, DISCIPLINARY RuLE 9-101(B) (1979) [Disciplinary Rules hereinafter cited as
DR without cross-reference] ("A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a mat-
ter in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee.") This
Note's analsis would still apply to lawyers, however, insofar as certain conduct not pro-
scribed by professional ethics may contravene the principles defined in this Note.
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groups, and the maintenance of the integrity of and public confidence
in government. Yet current law does not solve the problem. 5 The only
government-wide attempt to restrict the activities of former employees,
Title V of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978,6 applies only to
federal executive-branch officials and is limited to contacts by those
officials with their former agencies. Moreover, the statute is concerned
primarily with the narrow issue of undue influence. It thus fails to
address in any comprehensive manner the broader problem of the
misuse of confidential information obtained while in public em-
ployment.
This Note argues that the federal government should supplement
Title V by enforcing the fiduciary duty of its former employees, a
duty that requires those employees to keep confidential government
information confidential. 7 This approach to the problem possesses
5. The inadequacy of the law does not mean that Congress has been unaware of the
problem. See, e.g., Ethics and Financial Disclosure: Hearings on H.R. 3829 Before the
Subcomm. on Employee Ethics and Utilization of the House Comm. on Post Office and
Civil Service, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 72-75 (1977) (comments of Congressman Floyd J. Fith-
ian) (discussing problem of former public servants helping private employers "avoid
compliance" with federal regulations); Federal Ethics and Financial Disclosure: Hearings
on H.R. 6954, H.R. 2733, and H.R. 3928 Before the Subcomm. on Employee Ethics and
Utilization of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.
56-57 (1977) (statement of Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal) (discussing failure of
Ethics in Government Act predecessor to restrict former government employees' use of
government information); Financial Disclosure Act: Hearings on H.R. 1, H.R. 9, H.R.
6954, and Companion Bills Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Govern-
mental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 563-64 (1977)
(testimony of Thomas H. Henderson, Jr., Chief, Public Integrity Section, Criminal Di-
vision, Department of Justice) (discussing hypothetical case of former Justice Department
attorney) [hereinafter cited as Disclosure Act Hearings].
Professional and academic lawyers have also suggested ways to prevent the misuse of
government information. See SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST
LAWS, ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND
FEDERAL SERVICE 223-35, 246, 292-94, 803 (1960) (use of confidential information presents
conflict of interest and should be remedied by recovery of treble profits); Kalo, Deterring
Use of Confidential Government Information: A Proposed Citizens' Action, 72 MICH. L.
REV. 1577 (1974) (urging that citizens be allowed to sue former and present public em-
ployees on government's behalf to recover profits gained by use of confidential govern-
ment information); cf. Flaum & Carr, The Equitable Bill of Accounting-A Viable Remedy
for Combatting Official Misconduct, 62 ILL. B.J. 622 (1974) (recommending equity suits
against state officials for breach of fiduciary duty, particularly for misappropriation of
public funds).
For lawyers, DR 9-101(B) of the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979) is
directed in part to the problem of private use of confidential government information.
E.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28, 32-33 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds,
625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (DR 9-101(B) enforces policies against unfair use
and disclosure of confidential information); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241,
1247 n.1 (2d Cir. 1979) (Mansfield, J., concurring) (concern about private use of confi-
dential government information implicit in DR 9-101(B)).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 207 (Supp. III 1979).
7. A recent article has discussed the fiduciary duty of present government employees.
See Kalo, supra note 5. It does not, however, provide guidelines as to what government
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several advantages over the exclusive use of Title V's "bright-line"
rules and its criminal and administrative sanctions. Most importantly,
legal actions to enforce a fiduciary duty could reach all instances of
use of confidential or inaccessible information by former officials.
In addition, suit could be brought either by the government or by
certain private parties, and could seek relief through an injunction,
through recovery of a delinquent fiduciary's profits, or through dam-
ages if appropriate. Because enforcement of a general fiduciary duty
would be more comprehensive and more effective than Title V's sys-
tem of rules and sanctions, it would better serve the public interest
in governmental efficiency, fairness, and integrity.
I. Policies in the Regulation of Post-Government Employment
When a government servant" leaves his post to enter the private
sector, he may well take with him confidential information about the
government0 or, particularly if he enters a field with which he dealt
while in government, about his private employer's competitors.' 0 If
the departing public employee uses that information to benefit him-
self or his new employer, his activities may violate such basic values
as equal treatment by the government" and equal opportunity to
information is "confidential" and therefore protected by the duty, nor does it assess the
problem of private use of government information by former public employees, as this
Note does. Furthermore, since publication of the article, passage of the Ethics in Gov-
ernment Act of 1978 has altered regulations affecting former government servants, which
the fiduciary doctrine must take into account. Kalo also proposes a citizens' right of
action based on class actions that is different from the government and private causes
of action that this Note recommends. See note 87 infra (discussing differences).
8. Although this Note concentrates on former federal employees, the fiduciary doc-
trine that it recommends applies as well to state and local government servants. Those
employees may also misuse confidential information, see N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1980, § 1,
at 26, col. 3 (former city budget specialist accused of using inside knowledge of city
finances to help municipal labor union win bigger wage settlement), and states have
begun to recognize that the concept of a fiduciary duty provides a remedy, see note 61
infra (citing cases). In some instances, different bodies of state common law may lead
to different results. See note 117 infra (differences in punitive damages).
9. See, e.g., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 992 (1975) (classified CIA information); Empire Linotype School, Inc. v. United
States, 143 F. Supp. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (information about government contracts); N.Y.
Times, Feb. 19, 1980, § A, at 1, col. 3 (information about FBI Abscam investigation).
10. Cf. Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Abramson, 295 F. Supp. 87, 92 (D. Minn.
1969) (plaintiff alleged but failed to show that intervening party had obtained confiden-
tial information while serving as government witness in related litigation two years
before).
11. A government employee who dispenses special favors breaches a fundamental
duty to serve the public. See, e.g., United States v. King, 469 F. Supp. 167, 170-71 (D.S.C.
1979) (Foreign Service officer breached duty by giving favorable treatment to visa appli-
cations in return for special payment); United States v. Podell, 436 F. Supp. 1039, 1042
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (Congressman who lobbied for private airline for pay violated duty of
disinterested advocacy owed to government and constituents); H.R. Con. Res. 175, 72
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compete. 12 He or his employer may use the information to obtain
special treatment from the government, to exploit or evade a gov-
ernment program, 13 or to gain advantages over private competitors.
In addition, such unfair uses of information will have secondary ef-
fects, discouraging the full disclosure that is necessary to the admin-
istration of government programs' 4 and raising public doubts about
integrity in government.' 5 These secondary effects will in turn inter-
fere with the workings of government. 18
Stat. B12 (1958) (Code of Ethics for Government Service: "5. [Government employees
shall n]ever discriminate unfairly by the dispensing of special favors or privileges to
anyone ....")
12. See Tool Co. v. Norris, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 45, 54 (1865) (invalidating contract to
obtain supply contract from War Office because such contracts "directly lead to inef-
ficiency in the public service, and to unnecessary expenditures of the public funds").
The user of confidential government information has an advantage over his competitors,
and the result is economically inefficient because the advantage is unrelated to the user's
product or services. An inferior producer may surpass a superior competitor simply by
timely acquisition of confidential government information.
Arguably, in some cases, private use of confidential government information may be
the best use of that information. Selective disclosures of such information by former
government employees, however, will not necessarily produce those results because former
employees have no personal interest in keeping information secret and cannot calculate
the value of the government's interest in confidentiality. Thus information may be sold
too cheaply. Furthermore, disclosures of government information to achieve efficient
results should be made systematically. Decisions as to what information to release and
when to release it cannot be left up to to individuals.
13. See United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 551-54, 556-59
(1961) (consultant to government on cost of money supplied information to power com-
pany and bank to help them negotiate contract with United States); United States v.
Drisko, 303 F. Supp. 858, 860 (E.D. Va. 1969) (employee gave information to government
program participant as part of plan to obtain favorable treatment of participant's
claims against government).
14. Cf. FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 517 F.2d 137, 148 9. n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 974 (1977) (appellees resisted compliance with subpoenas duces tecum because of
fear that competitors could obtain information sought); United States v. Illinois Fair Plan
Ass'n, 67 F.R.D. 659, 661-62 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (acknowledging purpose of government con-
fidentiality to encourage candor from regulated businesses, but ordering discovery because
that policy not obstructed); Reauthorization of the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Agricultural Research and General Legislation
of the Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.
II, 556-57 (1978) (statement of Bennett J. Corn) (urging that CFTC be required to keep
information confidential so that traders will not hesitate to send commodities exchanges
necessary information).
15. Restoring public confidence in the government is one goal of Title V. See Regu-
lations Concerning Post Employment Conflict of Interest, 5 C.F.R. § 737.1(c)(1) (1980);
S. REP. No. 95-170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-34, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD.
NEws 4216, 4248-50 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT with page citations to U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws].
16. See United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562 (1961)
("[A] democracy is effective only if the people have faith in those who govern, and that
faith is bound to be shattered when high officials and their appointees engage in ac-
tivities which arouse suspicions of malfeasance and corruption."); SPECIAL COMMIrTEE
ON THE FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAws, AssOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
NEw YORK, supra note 5, at 6-7 (preservation of public confidence is "intensely prag-
matic concern").
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Certain restrictions should be placed, then, on the post-employment
activities of former government employees. These restrictions should
promote policies of equal access to government information, equal
treatment by the government, efficient administration of government
programs, and protection against private gain on the basis of confiden-
tial government information. Ideally, integrity in government would
flow from such equal treatment.' 7
Any restrictions must take account, however, of the policies mili-
tating against limits on the use of information obtained while in the
public employ.'8 Limitations on post-government career opportunities
may discourage talented people from entering government service,
where salaries are lower than in private industry.19 Furthermore, re-
strictions may prevent the use of personal knowledge and skills that
a public employee acquired on his own, not as a unique result of
government service.20
The desired calculus of these policies-protecting values of equality
and efficiency without placing undue restraints on personal talents
and decisions-narrows the range of possible limitations on post-
government employment. Such limitations must be comprehensive
17. Equal access to information should reduce the perceived need to use influence.
Cf. SENATE REPORT, sutpra note 15, at 4247 (elimination of undue influence and unequal
access to information will produce honest government).
18. The scope of a former public servant's First Amendment right to speak about
the government is unclear. Whether a disclosure is protected will depend on particular
characteristics of the information revealed that are outside the range of this Note's dis-
cussion. The fiduciary duty proposed in this Note does not rely on an explicit contract,
so First Amendment questions are not so easily passed over as they were in Snepp v.
United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980). Indeed, under the standard recommended in
this Note, see pp. 202-04 infra, no duty would have existed in Snepp because the infor-
mation involved was not confidential. Cf. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 518-21
(1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Snepp had duty only with respect to truly confidential
information). Furthermore, the government's recovery would have been restricted to that
portion of the profits that it showed had arisen out of the use of confidential informa-
tion. See pp. 204-05 infra. For a discussion of the appropriateness of a fiduciary duty
arising by contract, with which the Snepp decision independently agreed, see Comment,
32 STAN. L. REv. 409, 424-25 (1980).
19. The complaint is common that restrictions on post-government employment will
have this effect. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 6954 Before the Investigations Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Armed Services, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-27 (1977) (statement of Dr.
Harold Rosenbaum); id. at 11 (comments of Congressman Stratton); Conduct of Govern-
inent Personnel: Hearings on S. 695 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 45 (1977) (statement of Alan K. Campbell, Chairman,
U.S. Civil Service Commission); id. at 100-01 (comments of Senator Schmitt). But see id.
at 52 (comments of Senator Proxmire) (questioning whether such deterrent effect exists).
20. One of the attractions of government service is the training it provides. See, e.g.,
Disclosure Act Hearings, supra note 5, at 568 (statement of Congressman Bob Eckhardt)
(commenting on value of experience at SEC); Conduct of Government Personnel: Hear-
ings on S. 695 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, supra
note 9, at 94 (statement of David Cohen, President, Common Cause) (recognizing that
government service provides valuable training and experience).
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enough to deal with the wrong they purport to address, but specific
enough not to discourage all public service. The present restrictions
in Title V of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 fall outside that
range.
II. The Ethics in Government Act
Until recently, federal law reflected only piecemeal attempts to
deal with the exploitation by former government employees of infor-
mation obtained during their tenure.21 The Ethics in Government Act
of 1978 (Act) 2 2 however, introduced important and wide-ranging post-
employment restrictions on government officials. Title V of the Act
presents a series of "bright-line" rules for former federal employees
that disqualify them, temporarily or permanently, from communicat-
ing with or appearing before their former departments or agencies
with respect to certain matters.23  Although the Act provides both
criminal2 4 and administrative penalties, implementation of the law
depends primarily on administrative sanctions, 25 such as a prohibition
21. A few statutes contain restrictions, ranging from prohibitions of activities to
reporting requirements, directed to specific employees. Only one statute appears to bar
any post-employment activity. See 15 U.S.C. § 2053(g)(2) (1976) (senior Consumer Product
Safety Commission employees may not work for manufacturers subject to Consumer
Product Safety Act in first year after leaving CPSC). Similar temporary bars apply to
directors of some agencies who do not serve full terms. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 242 (Supp. III
1979) (Governor of Federal Reserve Board may not work for any member bank for first
two years out); 47 U.S.C. § 154(b) (1976) (Federal Communications Commissioner may not
represent anyone before FCC in first year out). Reporting requirements, which might
be seen as indirect restraints, apply to certain employees involved with government con-
tracts. See 42 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(1) (1976) (former National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration employees must file reports regarding their work for NASA contractors); 50 U.S.C.
§ 1436(b)(1) (1976) (same requirement for former senior Defense Department employees
working for Defense Department contractors). The statute making criminal any conspiracy
-to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976), has also been used to punish users
of confidential government information. E.g., Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462 (1910); United
States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971). The open-
ended quality of the crime as defined in the statute, however, suggests that the statute
be applied sparingly. See generally Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States,
68 YALE L.J. 405 (1959).
Other methods used to control former employees include CIA secrecy agreements, see,
e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (enforcing agreement), and DR 9-101(B)
of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, see, e.g., United States v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d
337, 340 n.6 (2d Cir. 1979) (disqualifying defendant's counsel because he had gained in-
formation related to case while working as government prosecutor).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 207 (Supp. III 1979).
23. Id. § 207(a)-(c). The length and nature of the restrictions depend on the former
employee's prior involvement in the matter, the nature of the matter he now seeks to
represent, and his prior employment grade.
24. Maximum penalties are a $10,000 fine or two years' imprisonment or both. 18
U.S.C. § 207(c) (Supp. III 1979).
25. 5 C.F.R. § 737.1(c)(6) (1980); see SENATE REPORT, supra note 15, at 4250 (reluctance
to enforce criminal penalties requires administrative sanctions).
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of appearances before or communications to the department or agency
involved for a period of up to five years.26 Agencies and departments
have primary responsibility for enforcing the post-employment rules27
and are to advise former employees who have specific problems.2
Although these restrictions improve previous law, their overall ef-
fectiveness is limited by the narrow scope of Title V's rules and by
the defects in its system of sanctions. These shortcomings undermine
both the Act's attempt to address the problem of undue influence,
which is its principal concern,29 and its effort to confront the more
fundamental problem of the abuse of government information.
A. Limitations on Scope
Title V's scope is restricted in several respects: to appearances be-
fore or communications with departments or agencies, to particular
matters involving specific parties, to matters in which the former
employee participated substantially or over which he had official re-
sponsibility, and, in some cases, to matters occurring within a certain
time period. These limitations reduce the range of abuses that the
law is able to reach.
First, some of the Act's provisions, because they apply only to an
appearance before or a communication with a department or agency,30
do not reach many private uses of confidential information. Knowl-
edge of a contemplated enforcement policy for a government program,
for example, could assist an employer in concealing activities from
government scrutiny. Even where an appearance or communication
will take place, work by a former government employee preparatory
to the event is clearly permissible,31 even if such work circumvents
the law's attempt to eliminate undue personal influence. In addition,
the unfair competitive advantage that a private employer might gain
from information held by a former public servant is unrelated to
contact with the government.
Second, provisions limiting Title V's scope to certain "particular
26. 18 U.S.C. § 207(j) (Supp. III 1979); see 5 C.F.R. § 737.27(a)(9)(i) (1980).
27. 5 C.F.R. § 737.1(c)(6) (1980).
28. Id. § 737.1(c)(8). An Office of Government Ethics in the Office of Personnel Man-
agement of the Civil Service Commission is available to advise agencies on questions
they may have. Id.
29. See SENATE REPoRT, supra note 15, at 4247-50. The report also indicates that the
law was intended to reach unfair uses of information as well. See id.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a), (b)(i), (c) (Supp. III 1979) ("any formal or informal appear-
ance ... [or] any oral or written communication").
31. 5 C.F.R. § 737.5(b)(5) (example 1) (1980).
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matters' 3 2 further narrow the law's coverage. Participation in broader
government matters-the making of policy, the formulation of regu-
lations-will not subject the participant to any of the Title V restric-
tions when he leaves office.33 Yet experience in these matters may
provide as much confidential information as involvement in more
specific concerns. 3
4
Third, portions of Title V require that a former employee have
"participated personally and substantially" 35 in a matter or had it
"under his official responsibility"3 6 before his post-employment ac-
tivity with respect to that matter is limited.37 An employee may learn
of confidential information, however, in connection with something
with which he was only marginally involved.38 The extent of the
private use of that information and of the inefficiencies it will create
are largely unrelated to how much work the former servant did with
the information while in government.
Finally, the temporary quality of many of the Act's restrictions
reduce their potential effectiveness even as to the limited class of
abuses they address. The rules contained in subsections (b) and (c)
of section 20739 assume that information will become less confidential
32. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2), (b)(2) (Supp. III 1979) ("any judicial or other
proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim,
controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest, or other particular matter involving
a specific party or parties"). "Rulemaking" is another matter forbidden to former high-
level officials. Id. § 207(c). "Rulemaking" includes the adoption of regulations and the
implementation of projects but not broad technical or policy issues discussed before a
program has become a project. 5 C.F.R. § 737.11(c) (1980).
33. 5 C.F.R. §§ 737.5(c)(1), 737.7(d) (example 1), 737.11(c) (1980).
34. Cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 350-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)
(defense to conflict of interest charge on ground that employment at government branch
office did not give improper access to information that might have been available at
central, policy-making office).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a) (Supp. III 1979) ("participated personally and substantially
as an officer or employee through decision, approval, disapproval, recommendation, the
rendering of advice, investigation or otherwise").
36. Id. § 207(b)(3) (no contact concerning a matter "which was actually pending under
his official responsibility as an officer or employee").
37. Former high-level officials are barred temporarily from all contacts with their
department or agency respecting a matter pending before it or in which it has "a direct
and substantial interest." Id. § 207(c)(3). The official's prior participation in the matter
is irrelevant. 5 C.F.R. § 737.11(b) (1980).
38. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 737.5(d)(l)-(2), 737.7(b)(3) (example 1) (1980) (responsibility for an-
cillary aspects of a matter does not subject former employee to restrictions for substantial
participation or official responsibility); cf. United States v. Drisko, 303 F. Supp. 858, 860
(E.D. Va. 1969) (employee in one division of Agriculture Department supplied confiden-
tial information from another division).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 207(b), (c) (Supp. III 1979). Although subsection (a) of section 207 im-
poses a permanent bar on certain activities of former government employees, the re-
strictions in subsections (b) and (c) last only for one or two years. Moreover, these periods
begin to run as soon as the employee has left his area of responsibility, whether or not
he leaves the government at that time.
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or less useful in one or two years; not all information, however, will
deteriorate so rapidly.40 The additional time restriction in section
207(b)(3), 41 specifying that a regulated situation must involve a matter
that appeared before the former employee in his last year of service,
similarly reduces the Act's protection.
As a result of these four limitations on Title V's scope, the law is
both under-inclusive and over-inclusive. Its restrictions fail to prohibit
the use of confidential information when characteristics of contact,
particular matter, prior participation, and, in some instances, time,
are not present. Yet the same restrictions may bar activities that ex-
hibit those characteristics but that include no undue influence or
use of confidential information. One consequence of these limited and
inconsistent rules is the knowledge that one will be restricted in his
career after leaving government, despite the absence of any wrong-
doing. This factor may account, in part, for Title V's perceived dis-
incentive to government service.42
B. The System of Sanctions
The effectiveness of Title V's system of sanctions is reduced by two
defects. First, the existing penalties cannot be tailored to fit the in-
tended wrongs. The administrative penalties, Title V's principal en-
forcement mechanisms, are insensitive to the seriousness of the vio-
lation. A wrongdoer, for example, may be barred from appearing
before an agency or department for a certain length of time,43 but
the impact of the penalty will depend largely on how often the
wrongdoer would otherwise have made such appearances and on how
much he would have earned, factors wholly unrelated to the extent
40. Although the paradigmatic problem will arise when a government official gains
possession of confidential information and, realizing its current value, leaves government
service in order to exploit it privately, some information will remain valuable over a
long period of time, in which case an official might not decide to use it until several
years after leaving government. For example, early results from scientific tests conducted
over several years will have value until the results are released. Regulations governing
the availability of department and agency information in the National Archives assume
that some information has long-term value and should not be made public for several
years. See 41 C.F.R. § 105-61.53 (1979). Litigation will also prolong the value of infor-
mation. See, e.g., Empire Linotype School, Inc. v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 627, 629-32
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) (information acquired two-and-a-half to six years before still confidential).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 207(b)(3) (Supp. III 1979) ("within a period of one year prior to
the termination of such responsibility").
42. See Wall St. J., Jan. 4, 1980, at I, col. 5 (Ethics in Government Act has caused
more people to leave government service and has made recruiting for SEC more difficult);
cf. Tolchin, New Law Hasn't Set Off Mass Loss of U.S. Aides, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1979,
§ B, at 10, col. 5 (no flood of departure from government in response to Title V's rules,
but recruiting expected to be more difficult).
43. The prohibition may last up to five years. 18 U.S.C. § 207(j) (Supp. III 1979).
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of the wrong the government seeks to punish. Furthermore, commis-
sion of a wrong under Title V might be so profitable that a wrong-
doer would accept any administrative sanction, knowing that the
government would be reluctant to bring a criminal suit,44 given the
relative severity of the criminal penalties.4a Indeed, the framers of
Title V recognized that criminal proceedings would be brought in-
frequently.46 Thus the sanctioning system is not responsive to the
severity of a violation: it provides unadjustable administrative pen-
alties, and supplies no intermediate enforcement option between those
penalties and harsh criminal sanctions.47
Second, Title V's administrative mechanisms may produce under-
enforcement. The lack of standards to guide imposition of adminis-
trative sanctions may lead to inconsistent penalties.48  Furthermore,
the Act relies for implementation on the vigilance of the agency or
department involved.49 This implementation strategy risks defeat by
the very means that the Act seeks to block: the exercise of undue
influence. An ex-government employee's contacts with his former
agency are prohibited so that he may not unfairly influence former
colleagues; yet Title V makes those colleagues, who presumably are
44. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 4250 (observing "great reluctance to bring
a criminal indictment against a former high level official" under the previous statute,
whose penalties were lighter); Disclosure Act Hearings, supra note 5, at 560-63 (testimony
of Thomas Henderson, Jr., Chief, Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, Depart-
ment of Justice) (discussing reluctance of Public Integrity Section to proceed criminally
for ethics violations). Even if the government were to use criminal penalties more regu-
larly, juries might still avoid convicting individual white collar defendants. See Note,
Structural Crime and Institutional Rehabilitation: A New Approach to Corporate Sen-
tencing, 89 YALE L.J. 353, 359 n.35 (1979) (discussing cases in which juries convict cor-
porations while acquitting co-defendant officers); Note, Decisionmaking Models and the
Control of Corporate Crime, 85 YALE L.J. 1091, 1096 n.27 (1976) (same).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 207(c) (Supp. III 1979) (providing for penalties of up to $10,000 or
two years' imprisonment or both).
46. See 5 C.F.R. § 737.1(c)(6) (1980) (giving agencies primary responsibility for en-
forcement of restrictions and recommending that criminal suits be brought only "in
cases involving aggravated circumstances"); SENATE REFPORT, supra note 15, at 4250 (noting
reluctance to bring criminal suits and therefore providing administrative sanctions in
Title V); cf. United States v. Conlon, 26 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2201, 2203 (D.D.C. Oct. 26,
1979) (noting "longstanding Congressional view that criminal penalties should be ap-
plied with care to the difficult area of conflicts of interest").
47. A similar problem of light penalties failing to deter wrongdoing and of other
possible penalties being deemed too severe to apply to that wrongdoing arises in federal
income tax enforcement. See Asimow, Civil Penalties for Inaccurate and Delinquent Tax
Returns, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 637, 638-52 (1976) (discussing inadequacy of IRS fraud and
negligence penalties and recommending intermediate sanctions).
48. See Thomforde, Patterns of Disparity in SEC Administrative Sanctioning Prac-
tice, 42 TENN. L. REV. 465, 497-524 (1975) (finding that under "public interest" standard
for sanctioning, SEC penalizes broker-dealers not affiliated with New York Stock Ex-
change more severely than affiliates without articulating basis for disparity).
49. 5 C.F.R. § 737.1(c)(6) (1980) (agencies have primary responsibility for enforcement).
198
Ex-Government Employees
susceptible to influence, responsible for reporting the ex-employee's
violation.
III. Toward a Fiduciary Duty for Former Government Employees
The defects of Title V require a supplementary program to ensure
that persons who occupy positions of public trust do not misuse con-
fidential government information once they leave public service. The
doctrine of a fiduciary duty, extended to hold former employees under
a duty to the government, will meet the problems of post-government
employment unsolved by Title V.
A. Foundation of the Duty
A fiduciary duty arises out of a relationship of trust.5° A fiduciary
is relied on to protect the interests of a principal, which often means
putting assets, including confidential information, 51 to the use of that
principal. The duty requires that a fiduciary not act in his own in-
terest at the expense of his principal's 52 and not use personally any
assets coming to him in the course of the relationship without per-
mission from the principal.5 3 Taking advantage of such a relationship
amounts to unjust enrichment, 54 with remedies lying in equity.55 In
50. 1 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 39 (3d ed. 1967). The term "trust" is used in
a non-technical sense, simply connoting faith in and reliance on someone. See Tate v.
Williamson, L.R. 2 Ch. 55, 61 (1866) (fiduciary relationship exists where confidence is
reposed by one in another and influence is possessed by another); Sealy, Fiduciary Re-
lationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 70-71 (fiduciary relationship originally identified as
"trust" in its general sense).
51. See, e.g., Tlapek v. Chevron Oil Co., 407 F.2d 1129 (8th Cir. 1969) (theory of
location of oil and gas deposits).
52. See, e.g., Higgins v. Shenango Pottery Co., 279 F.2d 46, 48-54 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 899 (1960) (corporate officers accountable for profits on contract diverted from
corporation to own partnership); Ragnar Benson, Inc. v. Kassab, 325 F.2d 591, 592-94
(3d Cir. 1963) (accounting ordered for similar diversion by corporate officer to own cor-
poration). This duty has been construed severely from its inception. See Keech v. Sanford,
25 Eng. Rep. 223 (Ch. 1726) (trustee of lease accountable for renewing lease in own
interest rather than for beneficiary, even though lessor had refused to renew lease to
trustee as trustee for beneficiary).
53. See, e.g., Moran v. Edson, 493 F.2d 400, 406-07 (3d Cir. 1974) (corporate assets
used to pay directors' life insurance premiums and excessive rent); Hunter v. Shell Oil
Co., 198 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1952) (confidential information about oil and gas deposits);
Components for Research, Inc. v. Isolation Prods., Inc., 241 Cal. App. 2d 726, 728-29, 50
Cal. Rptr. 829, 830-32 (1966) (secret manufacturing process).
54. See 5 A. ScoTT, supra note 50, at 3410-13, 3417-18 (breach of fiduciary duty one
form of unjust enrichment that constructive trust will remedy). Breach of fiduciary duty
is also considered a type of fraud, see, e.g., United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 305-06
(1910), although this analogy has been criticized, see Tlapek v. Chevron Oil Co., 407
F.2d 1129, 1133-34 (8th Cir. 1969).
55. See H. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 406-07 (2d ed. 1948)
(equity protects trade secrets and other confidential information); id. at 538-39 (fiduciary's
equitable duty to account). The remedy often used is imposition of a constructive trust
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addition, a third party who receives any fruits of the breach of duty56
or who purchases them with notice of the breach57 is also accountable
for them.
Because "[a p]ublic office is a public trust,"' 8 a fiduciary duty and
corresponding remedies should be recognized to exist for former gov-
ernment employees. The model for the duty is private sector employ-
ment, in which an employer may sue for a breach of duty that occurs
while an employee is in his hire.59 But the fiduciary doctrine extends
beyond this model in ways that reinforce its applicability to the
former public servant. First, the duty extends to a former employee
concerning certain information acquired during his term of employ-
ment. An employer may rely on an employee to keep certain infor-
mation confidential, and only when that reliance ends does the cor-
responding duty end, regardless of when employment was terminated.00
Second, a fiduciary duty is already recognized to extend to employees
of the federal government, insofar as the government entrusts to its
employees confidential job-related information."' The government,
on the fiduciary's profits for the benefit of the principal. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITU-
TION § 200 (1936) (fiduciary holds property acquired through use of principal's confi-
dential information as constructive trustee). A classic formulation is Judge Cardozo's:
"[a] constructive trust is then the remedial device through which preference of self is
made subordinate to loyalty to others." Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 467, 164 N.E.
545, 548 (1928).
56. Anyone who receives property without paying for it, if that property was wrong-
fully acquired from someone else, is enriched unjustly, whether or not he knows about
the wrong. 4 A. ScoTT, supra note 50, at 2343-44.
57. See Servo Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 716, 722-25 (4th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 934 (1966) (where plaintiff conveyed trade secret confidentially to cus-
tomer, defendant competitor liable for appropriating secret through contacts with cus-
tomer). Notice may consist of either actual notice of the breach of duty or "constructive"
notice; the latter occurs when the third party knows facts that under the circumstances
would lead a reasonably intelligent and diligent person to inquire whether a breach of
duty will be committed by completing the transfer. 4 A. ScoTT, supra note 50, at 2404-06;
5 id. at 3457-58; see RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 9, Comment d (1933) (defining "should
know"), incorporated by reference in RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 174, Comment a
(1936) (defining notice). At least where he has an opportunity to do so, the principal
must notify the third party of the alleged breach. See Ragnar Benson, Inc. v. Kassab,
325 F.2d 591, 595-96 (3d Cir. 1963) (principal visited third party but failed to mention
breach).
58. City of Boston v. Dolan, 298 Mass. 346, 354, 10 N.E.2d 275, 281 (1937).
59. See Sealy, supra note 50, at 74-77, 79-80 (master-servant a common relationship that
gives rise to fiduciary duties); cf. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J.
1 (1975) (fiduciary obligation based on policies of controlling agent's discretion and
protecting commercial organization).
60. See, e.g., Raines v. Toney, 228 Ark. 1170, 1180-81, 313 S.V.2d 802, 809-10 (1958)
(even if evidence supported corporate officer's claim that he had resigned, fiduciary duty
continued after that time); Opie Brush Co. v. Bland, 409 S.W.2d 752, 757-59 (Mo. App.
1966) (corporate officer liable for use of principal's confidential information in com-
peting business even though he had resigned).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 551,
556-59 (1961) (government construction contract rescinded where government agent, as
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moreover, has an even greater interest in the loyalty of its employees
than does a private employer.62 As with private employees, the ter-
mination of employment does not end the duty: a former employee
possesses information that the government still expects him to keep
confidential. 3 The fiduciary doctrine, then, should be recognized to
apply to former public employees.64
This duty to the government ought not obscure the government's
general obligation to be accessible. 65 The government should readily
part of violation of federal conflict of interest statute, supplied government information
to contractor); United States v. Drisko, 303 F. Supp. 858, 860 (E.D. Va. 1969) (employee
of Agriculture Department accountable for profits received for giving confidential De-
partment information to private party). Similar duties are owed to state governments by
state officials. See, e.g., City of Boston v. Dolan, 298 Mass. 346, 10 N.E.2d 275 (1937) (mis-
management of city securities); City of Minneapolis v. Canterbury, 122 Minn. 301, 307-09,
142 N.W. 812, 814-15 (1913) (sale by city procurement agent of own property to city);
Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, 474-77, 86 A.2d 201, 221-23 (1952)
(improper sale of bridge).
62. In addition to the government's interest in keeping certain information confiden-
tial so that it may run its programs more effectively, two other interests strengthen the
duty owed to the government. First, greater dislocations may occur through use of gov-
ernment information because a private business may gain an advantage against govern-
ment regulators as well as against its competitors, while private information will bring
only a private competitive advantage. Second, such a duty enhances loyalty and honesty
in government, often conceived of as good in itself, see, e.g., United States v. Kearns,
595 F.2d 729, 733-34 (D.C. Cir. 1978), and also increases confidence in the government,
a factor in the effective operation of government programs, see p. 192 supra.
63. Provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility covering lawyers' post-em-
ployment duty include this principle, although the Code's rule applies at the point of
access to confidential information rather than at the point of use of information. Cf. note
4 supra (citing cases from which former government lawyers barred because of previous
access to government information).
64. There appear to be no cases in which the federal government has sued to recover
the profits that an ex-official made in breach of his post-employment duty, absent an
express post-employment agreement, such as the CIA requires. Justice Stevens, however,
has suggested that the government could sue under such circumstances. Snepp v. United
States, 444 U.S. 507, 518 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf. Comment, 32 STAN. L. Rv.
409, 422-26 (1980) (applying fiduciary concept to Snepp). The government also has ob-
tained injunctions against former employees' uses of confidential information. In United
States v. Mahaney, 27 F. Supp. 463 (N.D. Cal. 1939), the SEC sued to enjoin one of its
former attorneys and the defendant corporations from using confidential information
that the attorney had obtained while with the SEC. In granting the injunctions, the
District Court relied primarily on the attorney's violation of the Canons of Professional
Ethics in representing a private party in a matter with which he was involved while
at the SEC. Id. at 466-68. The defendant corporations were also temporarily enjoined
from using the information because "the facts clearly warrant[ed]" it. Id. at 468-69. The
only explanation for the court's action seems to be that a third party purchaser of in-
formation supplied in breach of a confidential relationship-a fiduciary duty-cannot be
permitted to keep it. For further discussion of third party accountability, see notes 57
supra, 84-85 & 113 infra; cf. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975) (enjoining publication of classified CIA information, relying
on former CIA agent's secrecy agreement and national security grounds).
65. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 reprinted in [1966] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2418, 2429 (new government information act responds to obliga-
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give permission to use information that it possesses.66 In this way,
information that should be used can be used, thus enhancing effi-
ciency interests without forcing private businesses to run the risk of
litigation. Private employers, in turn, would have an incentive not
to assist breaches of fiduciary duty and would instead seek permission.
Implementation of this exception to the fiduciary rule would require
that departments and agencies establish their own procedures for
granting permission, procedures that presumably would ensure equal
access to the government by permission seekers and promote fair and
reasonably consistent responses.67
B. Content of the Duty
The meaning of "confidential government information" will de-
termine the scope of the fiduciary doctrine. In all cases, the definition
should guarantee that enforcement of the fiduciary duty will promote
the basic policy on which it rests: equal opportunity to use informa-
tion. Although the question whether equal opportunity exists can be
determined only in individual factual settings, certain guidelines may
be suggested. Clearly, information made public by the government
would not be protected by the fiduciary duty, whereas classified in-
formation would beAs The securities law concept of inside informa-
tion,69 which was designed with a similar intent to guarantee equal
access to information,7" suggests a test for determining when infor-
tion of open government). For a discussion of the obligation and how the government
should fulfill it, see Note, The First Amendment Right to Gather State-Held Information,
89 YALE L.J. 923 (1980).
66. A fiduciary in any context may use confidential information if the principal per-
mits him to do so. See 5 A. Scorr, supra note 50, at 3469-70. Permission must be clear,
however. See United States v. Mahaney, 27 F. Supp. 463, 468-69 (N.D. Cal. 1939) (finding
no evidence to support claim that SEC consented to have former SEC attorney represent
adverse party); cf. Tlapek v. Chevron Oil Co., 407 F.2d 1129, 1133-34 (8th Cir. 1969) (hold-
ing that openness of defendant's wrongful conduct was no defense because mere secrecy is
not touchstone for breach of fiduciary duty).
67. Departments and agencies should be equipped to predict the effect that the private
use of information will have on their programs and to measure that effect against the
benefits of the proposed use. The government's ability to grant permission should be
constrained by two factors, however. First, because private sources of confidential infor-
mation may still have an interest in confidentiality, the government should deny per-
mission to use that information unless the source also consents. Second, permissions must
stay within the bounds of statutes limiting disclosure of government information.
68. See Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
992 (1975) (enjoining publication of classified CIA information).
69. This Note does not recommend a "material inside information" test. The flexi-
bility of the constructive trust remedy, see note 55 suPra, which imposes liability in
proportion to the profits attributable to the misuse of information, makes a materiality
standard unnecessary.
70. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848, 851-52, 858 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (Rule lOb-5 based on policy of giving all
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mation becomes public. Publication occurs when "such information
: .. [has] been effectively disclosed in a manner sufficient to insure
its availability to the investing public."7' 1 The similar policy of equal
access underlying the fiduciary concept thus should allow a former
govemment employee to act on information only after it is published
in the Federal Register or in another generally available official pub-
lication, or has been disseminated widely by the news media.
Implementation of this general rule will require certain refinements
in order to meet the goal of equal access to information, as well as
to clarify the content of the duty and to avoid imposing unfair dis-
abilities on former government employees and their private employers.
The showings plaintiff is required to make in a suit for breach of
fiduciary duty7-- that the information used was confidential, that
profits were gained by its use, and, to recover from a third party,
that the party had notice of the breach-provide a framework for
discussing modifications of the duty.
To demonstrate the confidentiality of information, plaintiff should
show that the information was available only to government em-
ployees. 73 If some outsiders also had access, 74 then it could not be
asserted that a public employee had taken advantage of privileged in-
formation. 75 In addition, confidentiality should not discourage the
investors equal access to information); Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational
Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARv. L. REv. 322, 353-67 (1979) (pur-
pose of disclose-or-abstain rule is to prevent traders from using information to which
others do not have lawful access); Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne,
Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. Rlv. 1425, 1446 (1967) (market regu-
lated to ensure reasonably equal access to information preferable to one of unequal
access, even though the former may lead to sharper changes in price).
71. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Thus, someone holding secret information should not act
on it "until the news [of it] could reasonably have been expected to appear over the
media of widest circulation." Id.
72. See 5 A. ScoTT, supra note 50, at 3564-67 (discussing examples of fiduciary's breach);
id. at 3574-76 (explaining recovery of delinquent fiduciary's profits).
73. This showing of access implies a scienter requirement, and defendant could
plead lack of knowledge as an affirmative defense. However, knowledge of the confi-
dentiality of information may reasonably be inferred from a position of special access.
It seems reasonable to expect a government employee who has special access to infor-
mation to know that the information he sees is confidential. Only in an unusual case
could an employee defend successfully on the ground that he believed information to
be publicly available when in fact it was not.
74. Special authorization of certain outsiders to see government information would
not publicize information sufficiently to release it from protection of the fiduciary duty.
In some instances, the government may need private expertise, but it should not neces-
sarily have to sacrifice the confidentiality of its information to do so. Cf. 18 U.S.C. §
207(f) (Supp. III 1979) (creating exception in Title V for communication of scientific
or technological information).
75. Thus personal information about government officials, which might be important
to a business in deciding how to approach an agency, would not be protected by the
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use of personal knowledge and skills. Government employees should
not be barred from using ideas they developed during government
service if nongovernment people could have reached the same con-
clusions. Former public servants, therefore, should have an affirma-
tive defense that they used information that was or reasonably could
have been derived from available information.
The meaning of confidentiality in this context must also conform
to statutes governing the use of confidential information. Information
protected by the Privacy Act7 6 and other non-disclosure laws should
have the protection of the fiduciary duty, but information made
public, even if in apparent violation of those laws, should not. Be-
cause a former employee should not be prevented from using infor-
mation that anyone else may use, the fact of dissemination should be
enough to release him from his duty. On the other hand, information
requested from and released by the government under the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA)77 should be made public78 and left unpro-
tected by the fiduciary concept,79 even though broad distribution of
the information or even of the request is not always likely.80
The second element of plaintiff's case, identification of profits
gained, will create liability in proportion to the wrong. Plaintiff can
duty. Knowledge of how other agencies work, acquired during government service
through interagency contacts, would be protected if similar contacts and similar oppor-
tunities for observation were not available to private groups.
76. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The Act regulates the release of informa-
tion about individuals by federal agencies.
77. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
78. See H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 11, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2418, 2418, 2429 (declaring that new government information act is,
unlike its predecessor law, "a true Federal public records statute," permitting public to
see all federal records with few exceptions).
79. The fiduciary doctrine's principle of equality and the FOIA's principle of avail-
ability of information dictate that a former public servant should not be barred from
using information that any other citizen may obtain, despite the fact that the former
public servant could submit an FOIA request for information that he already has and
be free to use it when it is released. Two factors, in addition to the FOIA's categories
of information exempt from disclosure, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976), should prevent the
FOIA from swallowing the fiduciary concept. First, because the fiduciary doctrine pro-
tects government activities at least as much as private ones, an FOIA request will put
the government on notice as to information that the private employer of a former gov-
ernment employee now has. Second, private businesses, the group most likely to be
interested in information that competitors have, will probably take care to see what
FOIA requests competitors make.
80. Although the FOIA requires agencies to publish certain information in the Fed-
eral Register, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1976), and make other information "available for
public inspection and copying," id. § 552(a)(2), they will supply other information only




recover to the extent that the profit resulted from the breach.8' Fre-
quently, confidential information will be combined with other infor-
mation, in which case plaintiff can recover a part of the proceeds
equal to the proportional contribution of the confidential informa-
tion. 82 Determining exact proportions should be left to the trier of
fact.83
Recovery from a third party will require demonstration that the
party had actual or constructive notice8 4 of the breach of duty.85 This
standard would cover cases where third parties can avoid or prevent
breaches of duty, but would eliminate much of the disincentive to
deal with former government employees for fear that a breach of
fiduciary duty might be involved. An employer, the typical third party
in government fiduciary cases, should know an employee's previous
position in government and should recognize the general types of
information he would have handled. Therefore, when an employee
communicates either facts of that general type that are unknown to the
employer, or a theory that could be based only upon such facts, the
81. Cf. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 90-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd,
446 F.2d 1301, 1307-08 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971) (placing all profits
from trading on inside information in escrow fund for investors); 5 A. Scorr, supra note
50, at 3574-76 (discussing cases where profits of corporate fiduciaries were recovered).
82. See 5 A. Scorr, supra note 50, at 3642-44 (plaintiff entitled to pro rata share of
wrongdoer's property obtained after mingling plaintiff's property with his own); RE-
STATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 210, 214 (1936) (share of property or reimbursement of
value of thing taken).
83. No sophisticated calculations should be necessary. Similar decisions are required
in comparative negligence jurisdictions, and because those decisions may be regulated
by general guidelines, similar apportionments in fiduciary cases should be possible
without producing erratic judgments. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 278-79
(1974) (suggesting comparative negligence guidelines); cf. Note, Comparative Negligence-
A Survey o1 the Arkansas Experience, 22 ARK. L. REV. 692, 707 (table 7) (1969) (survey of
state lawyers indicates shift from contributory to comparative negligence rule generally
did not make liability and damages more difficult to explain to juries).
84. For a discussion of the requirements for constructive notice, see note 57 supra.
The principles of agency apply to notice, RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 174, Comment
d (1936); 4 A. ScorT, supra note 50, at 2427-28, so that a private business employee's
awareness of another employee's breach of duty to the government may be imputed to
the business.
85. A third party who receives fruits of the breach of a duty is liable if he purchased
them with notice of the breach or if he obtained them gratuitously, regardless of notice.
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 201 (1936); 5 A. Scorr, supra note 50, at 3568-71. In
government fiduciary cases, third parties, particularly private employers, should be
treated as purchasers with notice for several reasons. First, employers do hire former
public serants and can hardly be donees of information. Second, the notice require-
ment will not impose liability by surprise on employers and thus not discourage the
hiring of former government employees. Third, purchasers with notice are fully ac-
countable for profits gained with wrongfully acquired property, RESTATE,,iENT OF RESTI-
TUTION § 201 (1936); 5 A. Scor, supra note 50, at 3570, 3605, while donees are liable
only for the value of the property, RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 204, Comment d (1936);
5 A. Scort, supra note 50, at 3606-07, although this distinction may not apply to con-
fidential information, which sometimes can be valued only by the profits it produces.
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employer should understand that he may be receiving confidential
information. 6 An employer could not be held accountable for using
theories that might reasonably be based upon his own or other public
information because he would expect those theories to be freely usable.
C. Rights of Action
Effective implementation of the fiduciary doctrine requires that
both the government and private parties have rights of action.87 Suits
would be non-statutory, based on a federal common law of obligations
to the federal government.88 Government suits would be in equity,
86. A private employer could erect a rebuttable presumption of non-liability by
adopting certain screening procedures to prevent employees who used to work for the
government from transmitting government information to other people or areas in the
firm. The practice of some law firms offers a rough analogy: they may in some cases
screen former government attorneys to avoid disqualification as a firm under DR 5-
105(D) of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. See Kesselhaut v. United States,
555 F.2d 791, 792-93 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (firm erected sufficient barriers to exclude former
public official from participation in case); cf. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28, 33-34
(2d Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (discussing
factors affecting sufficiency of screening). Screening under the fiduciary doctrine provides
only a rebuttable defense, however, because liability accrues when information is actu-
ally used, not when there is merely access to information.
87. This Note proposes private rights of action different from the citizens' action
recommended in Kalo, supra note 5, at 1595-1608. Although the rights suggested here
could co-exist with Kalo's proposal, use of the rights here, if extended to cover present
employees as well, see note 96 infra, should make Kalo's citizens' action unnecessary.
Recoveries by plaintiffs under the theories of this Note should provide an incentive at
least as great as the attorneys' fees award that Kalo suggests for his plaintiffs. Further-
more, this Note's plaintiffs will generally be the defendants' competitors and will tend
to watch for the defendants' violations, while Kalo's plaintiffs will not be inclined to
be observant. Kalo's theory also contains two implementation problems that the tradi-
tional equity and tort remedies offered by this Note avoid. First, to overcome the
standing problem, the citizens' action requires statutory authorization. See Schlesinger
v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 224 n.14 (1973) (statute could give
private citizens standing otherwise lacking to sue public officials for conflict of interest).
This step will delay implementation and expose the proposal to limiting amendment.
Second, Kalo's action requires a preliminary hearing to determine plaintiffs competence
to sue, Kalo, supra note 5, at 1600-08, that will prolong litigation. At this hearing, the
government may challenge plaintiff's right to sue, id. at 1600-04, which will force the
court to examine whether the wrong alleged is legal or political, thus opening many
difficult problems of justiciability. See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, &
H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 233-41
(2d ed. 1973) (discussing political question doctrine).
88. Federal common law exists where federal interests require a uniform national
rule. Such interests arise when a transaction implicates federal legislative or constitu-
tional policies or when the federal government is treated as a legal entity requiring
rights and obligations consistent throughout the states. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (desirability of uniform national rule means federal com-
mon law controls paper issued by federal government); United States v. Kearns, 595 F.2d
729, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (using interest analysis to find that federal common law con-
trols fiduciary duty owed by present employee to federal government); Friendly, In
Praise of Erie-And the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 408-21 (1964)
(discussing areas governed by federal common law).
Federal courts will have jurisdiction both of government actions, see 28 U.S.C. § 1315
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while private suits might lie in either equity or tort, depending on
plaintiff's own involvement with the information used.
The government is not always allowed to bring a non-statutory
suit in equity,O but two theories of non-statutory actions support
the validity of suits founded on the fiduciary doctrine. First, the gov-
ernment has a cause of action when a private citizen would in an
analogous situation, 0 and the fiduciary doctrine has traditionally
regulated private relationships. Second, the federal government may
sue without a statute if the suit promotes constitutional powers91 or
legislative policies.92 The equitable actions proposed here would en-
able the executive-to enforce its power to command loyalty from its
employees 3 and to improve integrity and efficiency in government,
goals of the Ethics in Government Act.94 Title V does not interfere
with the government's right of action because to restrict an equitable
right, a statute must set forth an explicit limitation,9" which Title V
does not do.
(1976) (United States as plaintiff), and of private actions, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976)
(federal question; amount in controversy must exceed $10,000); cf. People Versus Porn
v. Nixon, 465 F. Supp. 340 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (suit against former President for breach of
fiduciary duty to federal taxpayers properly removed to federal court in part because
action raised question of duty of federal officer).
89. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 718-19 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring) (in absence of congressional authorization, courts will not issue injunction
on alleged national security grounds to halt newspaper publication of government infor-
mation); id. at 723 (Douglas, J., concurring) (same); id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring)
(same); id. at 732, 740 (White, J., concurring) (same); id. at 741-47 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring) (same); cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 313-17 (1947) (refusing
to create new common-law liability in tort for injury to American soldier).
90. See, e.g., United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 26-29 (1947) (permitting right
of action to protect proprietary interest in submerged lands); Cotton v. United States,
52 U.S. (11 How.) 229 (1850) (implying right of action for trespass).
91. See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 201-06 (1967)
(basing right of action on national power over interstate commerce).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 57-60 (1973) (holding
that interest in integrity of patents gives United States standing); cf. United States v.
Moore, 340 U.S. 616, 619-20 (1951) (power of court of equity to protect public interest
fully under Housing and Rent Act enabled it to grant government's request for resti-
tution order); Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 400 (1946) (similar result
under Emergency Price Control Act).
93. This power might be inferred from statute, 3 U.S.C. § 301 (1976) (delegation of
Presidential functions), or from the Constitution, U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3, cl. 4 ("[the
President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed"). Effective delegation
and faithful execution rest on the loyalty of government employees, whose duties in-
clude maintaining the confidentiality of government information.
94. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 15, at 4247 ("Honest government, and decisions
made in an impartial manner, are the objectives of this Title."); cf. United States v.
Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 563-66 (1961) (giving equitable relief not
specifically authorized by conflict of interest statute in order to promote policies of statute).
95. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 272 (1947) (applying
"old and well-known rule that statutes which in general terms divest pre-existing rights
or privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect").
Legal remedies must also be inadequate in order for an action in equity to lie, see, e.g.,
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The plaintiff in fiduciary actions typically would be the govern-
ment because the duty breached, that of maintaining the confidenti-
ality of information in government hands, is one owed through an
employment relationship. Nevertheless, information about the post-
employment activities of former public servants and incentives to sue
for wrongful acts would often be shared by the government and the
competitors of the former servant's new employer. Those competitors
presumably would detect the use of information that the government
had obtained from them and would perceive any competitive advan-
tage that the private employer gained through the use of the infor-
mation.
In two types of cases, therefore, private parties should be able
to sue other private parties"6 for the improper use of confidential
government information.97 First, a private right of action similar to
the government's should arise where private use is made of informa-
tion that had been sent to the government on the understanding that
it would be kept confidential. The former employee who profited
from that information owed a duty of confidentiality both to the
government and to the private source, and both should be able to sue.98
H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 55, at 98-99, 103-05, but it is clear that current law does not
adequately address the problem of delinquent fiduciaries to the government. See pp. 195-
99 supra.
96. Private suits should be able to reach abuses of information involving current as
well as former government employees. The fiduciary duty violated is the same, and the
private plaintiff suffers the same injury whether the public servant causing it is still
employed by the government or not.
97. Such actions may be founded on a theory that anyone whom a rule of law is
designed to protect may sue when wronged by a violation of that law. This theory
parallels the theory of private rights arising under statutes and the Constitution. See,
e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (statutory action by member of class "for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted") (quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S.
33, 39 (1916)); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 390-97 (1971) (action for damages where Fourth Amendment rights are violated).
Cort also includes other tests for legislative intent and consistency with the legislative
scheme in order to determine whether a private right of action exists. These tests are
peculiar to statutory rights, but rest on the broader question whether the policy of the law
justifies a private suit.
Much of the discussion in cases such as Cort and Bivens focuses on whether the right
of action is federal rather than state. Private suits alleging breaches of a federal fiduciary
duty are clearly appropriate for federal adjudication. At the core of any private suit
would be whether the defendant violated a duty to the federal government. This im-
plication of a right possessed by the federal government, see, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l
Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33-34 (1956) (suggesting federal common law
will control private litigation that "touch[es] the rights and duties of the United States");
American Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 292 F.2d 640, 643-44 (9th
Cir. 1961) (federal common law controls subcontract between private parties under gov-
ernment contract because national rule needed), indicates that federal courts rather than
state courts should decide the cases. Federal jurisdiction would also be appropriate so
that uniform rules concerning the duty could be developed. See note 88 supra.
98. Enforcement of the fiduciary duty will impose an additional task on the Depart-
ment of Justice, which has limited resources for prosecuting claims. This constraint, to-
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Second, a right of action should accrue to a private party who has
been injured by the use of confidential government information,"0
regardless of the source of the information. Although an agent is not
always liable in tort to a third party for breach of duty to his prin-
cipal,100 such liability should exist here because the duty of former
government employees to keep information confidential is higher than
that of agents in the private sector.' 0 ' Both the obligation to the
public that inheres in government employment and the public pol-
icies that require the maintenance of confidentiality raise the level
of the duty owed to the government. The importance of this duty to
the government in turn increases the need for enforcement of the duty.
Private suits would fill the enforcement gaps that a government with
limited resources inevitably leaves.
D. Advantages of the Doctrine
The broad reach and flexible sanctions of the fiduciary doctrine
enable it to avoid the problems of limited scope and defective penalties
that Title V presents. Despite its lack of "bright-line" rules, the doc-
trine still possesses the clarity necessary for employees and judges to
understand it.
1. Breadth of Scope
The concept of a fiduciary duty is better tailored to reach prob-
lematic post-employment activities than are the Title V rules because
an action for breach of the duty is more responsive to individual
factual settings. The contours of the duty do not depend on per se
rules; rather, whatever confidential information an employee gained
gether with political pressures and concerns about the possible undesirable effects of
fiduciary suits, might tend to discourage suits by the government. See, e.g., Kalo, supra
note 5, at 1586-87 (speculating why government brings so few fiduciary suits). Private
suits will free enforcement of the fiduciary duty from such inhibitions. Cf. J.I. Case
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (private right of action under § 14(a) of Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 provides "necessary supplement" to action by SEC, which has
little time to find violations in proxy materials).
99. These damage actions would be in tort rather than in equity because there would
be no duty of confidentiality with respect to the plaintiff's information; the plaintiff,
therefore, would have to show actual injury. Losses would fall into two categories: loss
of something already possessed and loss of something the plaintiff would have had if
the defendant had not used confidential government information. The former category
of injuries should be easy to measure, but the latter, which will include cases of bidding
for government contracts, will not: the plaintiff will have to show the substantial like-
lihood that he would have possessed the thing had the defendant not improperly used
government information.
100. See RESTATEiENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 352-354 (1957).
101. See note 62 supra.
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while with the government would determine the scope of his fiduciary
duty. No advantage would attach to positions that give access to in-
formation but that fall outside Title V restrictions, 10 2 and no liability
would discourage the free use of information when there is no abuse
of confidentiality. As a result, the fiduciary duty doctrine should not
present the disincentives that impair the Title V rules. The doctrine
would discourage only those who hope to obtain confidential infor-
mation for their own use, exactly the effect that a rule designed to
promote equal opportunity to use information should have.
Use of the fiduciary doctrine would also avoid a lack of clarity10 3
that could discourage public service'0 4 or impede the efficient use
of information. It is true that Title V's "bright-line" rules may be
clearer than the proposed doctrine, 03 which is tied to the less fixed
standards 0 6 that govern decisions as to the confidentiality of informa-
tion. Furthermore, the content of the fiduciary duty would vary in in-
dividual cases because of different degrees of access to and willingness
to use confidential information. On the other hand, no one appears
to have questioned the clarity of the fiduciary doctrine as applied in
the private sector,0 7 and guidelines could, in any event, be set to
clarify its scope in the public context.10 8 In addition, two other qual-
ities of the standard should minimize any undesirable deterrent ef-
fects. First, the burden for understanding the rule would rest on gov-
ernment employees, 109 who are in the best position to know whether
102. Thus, for example, a staff assistant who sees work produced elsewhere that his
chief must approve will be barred from using confidential information contained in it.
By contrast, the elements of Title V that require official responsibility and personal and
substantial participation do not reach people with such access. See p. 196 supra.
103. An unclear rule would have two opposite effects. First, for the risk averse, it
would deter legitimate behavior felt to approach the line of wrongdoing. Second, for
those not averse to risk, a vague rule might seem to increase the possibility of non-
enforcement and thus increase the incentive to break the rule. See R. POSNER, ECONOIuC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 424-25 (2d ed. 1977).
104. See United States v. Conlon, 26 GRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2201, 2202-03 (D.D.C. Oct.
26, 1979) (construing conflict of interest statute narrowly to avoid vagueness and dis-
incentive to government service that vagueness creates).
105. But see N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1979, § A, at 30, col. 1 (editorial criticizing Ethics in
Government Act as vague).
106. Those standards contrast with Title V, whose restrictions are limited to cases in-
volving contact, prior participation, particular matter, and, in some instances, time. See
pp. 195-97 supra.
107. This absence of criticism may indicate that judges apply widely held notions of
what the fiduciary doctrine should include. Implementation of the duty is left up to
the judge in equity, who acts according to the principles established by prior decisions
in equity, see H. McCLINTOCK, supra note 55, at 51-52 (judge does not have personal
discretion in equity but bases decisions on established principles), which are supposed
to represent decisions of conscience.
108. See pp. 202-06 supra (suggesting such guidelines).
109. Employer liability puts some burden on a third party as well, but that burden
should be limited to a good faith effort to isolate pockets of confidential information
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they are using confidential information. 110 Second, the doctrine pos-
sesses the clarity of a "reasonableness" standard: cases would not be
judged arbitrarily, but in accordance with objective standards as to
what uses of information are unfair."'
2. Appropriate Sanctions
The variety of equitable sanctions available under a fiduciary duty
standard could be used to tailor a response to fit the particular breach
of duty,'1 2 thereby avoiding Title V's sanctioning and enforcement
problems. Recovery of ill-gotten gains would extract from the defen-
dant, whether former employee or third-party employer,"13 exactly
possessed by an employee. The government's ability to grant permission to use informa-
tion should be an incentive for an employer to make such an inquiry. Furthermore, the
emplo er would be liable only when the former public servant is personally liable;
such personal liability should discourage the employee from using confidential infor-
mation in the first place.
110. Employees know most easily and most cheaply when an abuse might occur and
are in the best position to stop it. Placing the burden on them is consequently the most
efficient way of implementing the fiduciary duty. Cf. G. CALABPSI, THE CosTs OF Ac-
CIDENTS 69-94, 135-73, 312 (1970) (discussing imposition of burdens in tort on cheapest
cost avoider).
Ill. Clarity of a rule functions both to guide judges in decisions and to regulate
individual conduct. See Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109
U. PA. L. Rav. 67, 81, 89-96 (1960) (concluding that Supreme Court invalidates state statutes
as unconstitutionally vague in part because federal courts must have clear indication
of what state law is). A judge has greater freedom to interpret the fiduciary doctrine
to reach just results than to modify statutory rules; this diminishes the doctrine's need
for clarity relative to the need of a statute such as Title V. Moreover, the judicial ability
to resolve cases according to the principles of equity reduces the need for precision be-
cause society's norms of just behavior inform those principles. Cf. Nash v. United States,
229 U.S. 373, 376-78 (1913) (common law frequently requires individuals to estimate
conduct against reasonableness of jury); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86,
109-10 (1909) (state antitrust statute barring activities "reasonably calculated" to limit
trade or fix prices not unconstitutionally vague).
112. Tailoring makes penalties proportional to the crime, which lends a sense of
retributi'e justice to a society's regime of punishments: greater wrongs should be pe-
nalized more than lesser wrongs. See H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBILITY 233-34
(1968). Proportionality can also be considered in utilitarian terms of deterrence. To the
extent that the benefits of a wrong are weighed against the likelihood of capture and
the severity of punishment, properly tailored and consistent penalties deter the commis-
sion of wrongs precisely to the extent society wishes them deterred. Disproportional pen-
alties will fail to do this and may also undermine public respect for the law. Note,
Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 CoLut. L. REv. 1119, 1121 n.12
(1979). The goal of deterrence in any individual case may require a disproportional
sentence, however. H. PACKER, THE LinmTs OF ThE CRIMINAL SANCTION 139-45 (1968).
113. See, e.g., Hunter v. Shell Oil Co., 198 F.2d 485, 489-90 (5th Cir. 1952) (imposing
constructhe trust on oil lands held by third party business associates who had acquired
lands on basis of plaintiff's confidential information); United States v. Mahaney, 27 F.
Supp. 463 (N.D. Cal. 1939) (enjoining third party client from using confidential SEC
information).
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the amount of his wrongful benefit." 4 The stigma of a criminal con-
viction would not attach to a wrongdoer and would not discourage
prosecutors, 1" 5 but forced restitution would destroy any incentive to
violate the duty. In addition, a fuller range of remedies would be
available when appropriate: compensatory damages when there was
injury,"16 exemplary damages" T for intentional egregious breaches, 118
114. A delinquent fiduciary to the government must account for, or become con-
structive trustee of, his profits. E.g., United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 306, 317-18
(1910); United States v. Bowen, 290 F.2d 40, 44-45 (5th Cir. 1961); United States v. Drisko,
303 F. Supp. 858, 860-61 (E.D. Va. 1969).
115. See United States v. Conlon, 26 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2201, 2202-03 (D.D.C. Oct.
26, 1979) (noting congressional hesitation to stigmatize activities in the murky field of
conflicts of interest); cf. note 44 supra (citing government reluctance to prosecute).
116. See, e.g., United States v. Bernard, 202 F. 728, 731-32 (9th Cir. 1913) (compen-
satory damages part of incidental relief that court of equity may give).
117. Traditionally, a court of equity has been unable to award exemplary damages.
See id. at 732 (punitive damages beyond competence of equity court). A minority of
states now take the opposite view, however, on the theory that the disability arises out
of the jurisdictional separation of law and equity, which the merger of those courts
removes. The power to award exemplary damages is, in their view, discretionary with
the court, dependent upon some showing of intent or malice. See, e.g., Starkovich v.
Noye, 111 Ariz. 347, 350-52, 529 P.2d 698, 701-03 (1974) (fraud); Charles v. Epperson &
Co., 258 Iowa 409, 431-32, 137 N.W.2d 605, 617-18 (1965) (intentional fraud); I.H.P. Corp.
v. 210 Central Park South Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 329, 332-33, 189 N.E.2d 812, 813-14, 239
N.Y.S.2d 547, 548-49 (1963) (malice). In order for federal courts to craft appropriate equi-
table remedies for breach of fiduciary duty to the government, it is important that they be
able to award exemplary damages, in accord with the minority state view. Because the
fiduciary doctrine would be part of federal common law, see note 88 supra, forum state
decisions should not be controlling. It may be necessary, however, to imply a materiality
requirement when exemplary damages are sought because it has been said that such
damages will be awarded only when there is a sufficient injury. See Starkovich v. Noye,
111 Ariz. 347, 351-52, 529 P.2d 698, 702-03 (1974) (discussing sufficiency of equitable
relief or compensatory damages to support award of punitive damages); cf. International
Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.V.2d 567, 584 (Tex. 1963) (actual harm to
plaintiff one factor in making award of exemplary damages). But see United States v.
Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 937-38 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 444 U.S. 507 (1980)
(punitive damages may be awarded even if compensatory damages are nominal).
118. Exemplary damages punish and deter. They would therefore provide an ef-
fective device for enforcing the fiduciary doctrine insofar as the restorative function of
a constructive trust might leave some incentive to violations. Punitive damages are left
in the discretion of the trier of fact so that they may be granted if the wrong seems to
require greater punishment or deterrence than regular damages or equitable relief can
give. For example, some former public servants might calculate that it is profitable to
breach their duty to the government because they can lose no more than their wrongful
profits and because the probability of successful prosecution is less than one. Punitive
damages are aimed precisely at such calculations, and should be awarded when such
intention is clearly inferable from the circumstances. See Charles v. Epperson & Co., 258
Iowa 409, 432, 137 N.W.2d 605, 618 (1965) (awarding exemplary damages because com-
pensatory damages insufficient to deter intentional fraud); International Bankers Life
Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567, 584 (Tex. 1963) (unconscionable conduct warrants
award of exemplary damages as deterrent).
Even without punitive damages, a successful suit will subject the defendant to the
moral opprobrium of the community, an additional sanction that may have some effect.
Cf. H. PACKER, supra note 112, at 42-43 (social disgrace part of threat of criminal punish-
ment that gives it deterrent effect); E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 245-56 (1949)
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and injunctions to prevent future violations. 1 9 This array of remedies
should enable a court effectively to enforce the fiduciary doctrine.
A breach of duty suit would also reduce the threat of inconsistent
enforcement 2° that arises from Title V's focus on government con-
tacts. Because the fiduciary obligation reaches situations other than
appearances before or communications with departments or agencies,
reports of violations could be expected to come from outside sources
in addition to interested government servants. Competitors suspecting
wrongful conduct would complain to the government. Furthermore,
enforcement would not depend entirely on government willingness to
sue. Even when the government might have little incentive, misuse
of a private party's information (supplied to the government) or mis-
use injuring a private party would give rise to a private right of action.
E. Discovery and Harassment
Although private suits for breach of fiduciary duty to the government
might raise problems of harassment or abuse of discovery, courts are
equipped to forestall such tactics. Discovery could defeat the purposes
of the fiduciary duty in several ways. First, the possibility of discovery
might tempt businesses to sue competitors in order to acquire their
confidential information, regardless of the grounds for suit. Protective
orders, however, are available to prevent the acquisition and use of
information outside of litigation, and courts should issue such orders
when appropriate. 121 In addition, discovery in private suits might, in
seeking to establish the confidentiality of government information,
(isolation of business from criticism of "public agencies of communication" and public's
difficulty in understanding complex business arrangements allows white collar crime
to flourish). The possibility of private suits should also increase the likelihood of en-
forcement and reduce the temptation to violate the duty.
119. See, e.g., United States v. Mahaney, 27 F. Supp. 463 (N.D. Cal. 1939) (enjoining
use of confidential SEC information).
120. Prosecution of breach of duty suits might take more time and require the par-
ticipation of more people than the administrative enforcement mechanism in Title V.
Recovery of defendants' profits should offset many of these added costs. Even if it does
not, however, equitable suits are still preferable because their advantages would out-
weigh any slight increase in costs.
121. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) authorizes courts to issue protective orders "which justice
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense. ... Confidential information may be protected, see FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(c)(7) ("a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commer-
cial information"), so that it is used only in litigation. The moving party must demon-
strate that diclosure of alleged confidential information "will work a clearly defined and
very serious injury." United States v. IBM Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40, 46-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Courts have the ability to issue particularized orders, see, e.g., Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Sun-
beam Corp., 61 F.R.D. 598, 602 (D. Del. 1973) (restricting availability of informationtIo
discovering party's trial counsel), and should accordingly protect information in fidu-
ciary suits.
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also disrupt the operations of the government. Discovery that violates
privileges surrounding certain types of government information would
be prohibited.122 Finally, although the government usually cannot
prevent discovery simply on the ground of burdensomeness, 123 courts
should restrict the manner or scope of discovery so that it is as con-
venient as possible.' 24 The discovering party also might have to bear
some of the costs of discovery.12 5
Private fiduciary suits might also seem to offer a means for busi-
nesses to harass competitors. To prevent such abuses of litigation,
plaintiffs who brought harassment suits should be liable for defen-
dants' attorneys' fees and expenses.' 26 Liability would not arise when
a suit was merely unsuccessful, 27 but the fiduciary standard would
be simple enough to recognize that groundless suits would be dis-
missed at an early stage. 128 As a result, nonmeritorious suits designed
122. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1953) (military secrets);
Republic of China v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 142 F. Supp. 551, 556-57 (D. Md. 1956)
(diplomatic secrets). Information reflecting government decisionmaking processes is also
protected so that the candor necessary to full deliberation is not inhibited, see, e.g., Carl
Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 324-26 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd Per
curiam, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967) (protecting Justice De.
partment documents), but this consideration may be outweighed by litigants' need for
information about government decisions, see Pierson v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 384,
395-96 (D. Del. 1977) (where records of IRS decision to revoke letter ruling were of "great-
est need" to plaintiff and "most relevant" to judicial review, balance of discovery pol-
icies heavily in favor of disclosure).
123. See, e.g., CuIp v. Devlin, 78 F.R.D. 136, 140 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (need for informa-
tion justified discovery despite great burden imposed on government).
124. See, e.g., United States v. IBM Corp., 60 F.R.D. 650, 652-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (fram-
ing protective order so that United States need not search its files again); Colonial Capital
Co. v. General Motors Corp., 29 F.R.D. 514, 518 (D. Conn. 1961) (limiting plaintiffs to
written interrogatories of chief of defendant corporation in order to save his time);
Haymes v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 16 F.R.D. 118, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (requiring parties
to agree on convenient deposition schedule).
125. See Moore v. George A. Hormel & Co., 2 F.R.D. 340, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (rule
authorizing court to frame discovery orders as justice requires permits court to order
discovering party to pay some discovery expenses).
126. Although the "American Rule" holds that each party bears his own fees and
expenses, a losing party who acts in bad faith will be liable to his opponent for fees
and expenses. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-59
(1975). Harassment, delay, or other litigation abuses constitute bad faith supporting an
award of fees and expenses. See, e.g., Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630, 639-40
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 620 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980) (making award where
suit brought to damage reputation and credibility of writer and publisher).
127. See, e.g., Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078,
1088 (2d Cir. 1977) (rule exists so that plaintiffs "with colorable, albeit novel, legal claims
would [not] be deterred from testing those claims in a federal court.")
128. Defendants will have to police their own interests in halting groundless suits.
Lack of an early protest may indicate that a claim is not entirely bad. See id. at 1088
(conclusion that claim against one defendant for breach of fiduciary duty was colorable




to force defendants to settle rather than to bear the burden of trial
would be unlikely to occur.129
Conclusion
The concept of a fiduciary duty to the government offers a remedy
for the misuse of confidential government information by former pub-
lic employees. Current and former public employees are under a duty
to maintain the confidentiality of government information; if they
breach that duty, they and knowledgeable third parties who benefit
from the breach should be accountable for their profits and for other
damages. Breach of the duty may injure either the government or a
private party, and both should have a right of action. Only such a
scheme of rights will guarantee equal access to and equal treatment
by the government, while enabling the government to operate fairly
and effectively.
129. Furthermore, the requirements for standing-use of the plaintiff's information or
use of government information to the plaintiff's detriment-generally restrict the class
of plaintiffs to the defendant's competitors; competitors, however, would be unlikely to
bring such suits for two reasons. First, particularly in industries highly regulated by
the government, potential plaintiffs will have their own former public servants and so
will themselves be vulnerable to suit. They should be hesitant to start such litigation
without reason. Second, business competitors will not be judgment-proof and so will
have something to lose if fees and expenses are awarded. The incentive that judgment-
proof status gives plaintiffs in other types of litigation to sue hoping to force settlements,
see, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548-49 (1949) (discussing
state attempts to eliminate "strike suits" brought by shareholders who have little stake
in outcomes), is absent here.
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